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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to put the future of the US dollar into 
a logical framework which comprises the global development mechanism. 
Two  models  of  growth  collide:  the  US  «locomotive»,  based  on  the 
international use of the dollar, and which requires exogenous pushes coming  
permanently  from  the  foreign  deficit  and  periodically  from  the  public 
deficit,  and the «endogenous», or «autopoietic». The engine of autopoietic 
growth is the process of globalization, alimented by foreign investments and 
the  emerging  economies’  domestic  demand,  which  in  turn  require  the 
establishment of an international monetary standard. In absence of a real 
international  cooperation,  the  conflict  of  the  two  models  might  bring  a 
global currency crisis and a fall in the global growth rate, with a possible 




The  world  is  puzzled  by  the  future  of  the  US  dollar.  Many 
scholars, predicting that an adjustment of the current account of 
the  US  balance  of  payments  is  necessary,  are  estimating  the 
extent of the necessary, further devaluation of the dollar
2. On a 
purely logical basis, we could say that the dollar, starting from 
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the current, depreciated levels, could furtherly depreciate or even 
appreciate. However, instead of giving a forecast of its value in 
the next future, this paper will try to provide a logical framework 
for giving a reply to the puzzle. 
The starting point of the analysis, in our opinion, should be the 
global  development  models.  On  the  one  hand,  the  US 
expansionary  policies  helped    the  development  of  the  western 
countries after the second world war, giving birth to the so-called 
“American  locomotive”  model.  This  model,  based  on  the  US 
current  account  deficit  financed  by  larger  and  larger  capital 
inflows, uses the dollar as the international currency, but has no 
formal or informal agreement to regulate that. On the other hand, 
the  entrance  on  the  market  of  about  three  billions  of  new 
potential  consumers  and  a  growing  number  of  new  potential 
producers,  potentially  doubling  the  people  participating  in  the 
economic activity on the planet (with consequences still largely 
unknown) creates a new model of development, which does not 
need  the  American  locomotive  and  has  an  endogenous  (or 
“autopoietic”) capacity of growth. Needless to say, this kind of 
model  does  not  need  either  the  dollar  as  the  international 
currency.  
If the first goal of this paper is to evaluate the relevance of  a 
substitution of the locomotive model with the autopoietic model, 
the second goal is therefore to understand whether the current co-
existence  of  the  two  models  can  cause  problems  to  the 
international  monetary  system  centered  on  the  dollar  and, 
through this, to the world development. 
The third goal of this paper is to verify the relations between the 
current  international  monetary  order  and  competition  in  the 
global  market.  If  the  cost  of  dollar  devaluations  is  different 
among traded (i.e. exposed to competition) and non-traded (i.e. 
non-exposed)  sectors,  and  in  fact  the  burden  of  it  is  only  on 
traded sectors, which are price-takers, the rents are strengthened   3 
with  respect  to  the  profits
3,  penalizing  the  trend  of  the  real 
growth. 
2.  Two models of economic development and the 
international monetary regime. 
The  development  of  the  modern  industrial  economies,  starting 
from the second half of the 20th century, is based on the tow of 
the «American locomotive» and on the use of the dollar as the 
international  currency.  This  well-known  mechanism  needs  a 
permanent current account deficit of the US, i.e. it needs that the 
US absorb a growing share of the world savings to live above 
their resources. It also needs a transitory public (federal) deficit, 
i.e. an exogenous push of domestic demand, creating the well-
known «twin deficits». 
In  the  last  part  of  the  20th  century,  a  new  pattern  of  growth 
started to emerge, following the entrance of new consumers and 
producers after the fall of the iron curtain, the associated wave of 
liberalizations and the growth in foreign direct investments and 
domestic demand in emerging countries. This new mechanism, 
which we call «endogenous» or «autopoietic
4» (Varela, 1992), 
does  not  require  the  twin  deficits  because  it  is  based  on  an 
endogenous  demand  which  renders  the  exogenous  pushes 
unnecessary. Given these characters, the locomotive model could 
become anachronistic and dangerous (Savona, 2004). 
Before August 1971, when the Bretton Woods Agreement was 
still  in  operation,  the  rest  of  the  world  had  the  possibility  to 
control excessive foreign deficits of the US by converting dollars 
in gold at a fixed price. There was therefore an instrument which 
allowed the control at margin of the international money supply 
denominated in dollar. 
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After  August  1971,  the  US  unilaterally  decided  to  break  this 
monetary bound to their growth, forcing the other countries to 
take autonomous decisions to react or not to the floating of the 
external  value  of  the  dollar.  Under  this  new  international 
monetary regime, the only way to protect the exchange rate of 
any  country  from  the  flooding  of  dollars  is  buying  them  as 
official reserves, creating domestic base money. If this creates an 
excess supply of domestic money, the monetary authorities are 
forced to sterilize this excess.  
Under this regime, therefore, non-US monetary policies are not 
targeted  to  domestic  goals  anymore,  but  to  the  course  of  the 
dollar. This of course could imply a choice between development 
and  sovereignty.  If  an  economy  is  dependent  on  exports,  and 
wants to have an exchange rate stability, it has to give up its 
monetary  sovereignty  because  monetary  policy  is  subjected  to 
the volatility of the dollar exchange rate. 
Given these premises, it is correct to say, as originally stated by 
former US Treasury secretary Connolly and recently restated by 
Treasury secretary  Snow, that «the  dollar is our currency,  but 
your  problem,»  where  «your»  means  the  rest  of  the  world. 
However  cynical,  this  statement  correctly  recognizes  that  the 
dollar  is a problem,  but transfers  it  from economic  to  foreign 
policy. 
Given that the dollar, in this system, has become the world’s fiat 
money, we argue that the US should agree – at least in principle – 
on the necessity of a cooperative policy on exchange rates, to 
obtain a monetary standard governed by some rules. The absence 
of  an  international  monetary  standard  created  through  an 
agreement transfers the burden of the adjustment from the US to 
the other countries or, worse yet, assigns the government of the 
exchange rates exclusively to the market. Both of these solutions 
could have very serious consequences, from the economic and 
political points of view. 
If the «locomotive» model were the relevant one for the global 
growth  mechanism,  the  current  international  monetary  order 
could still be accepted, albeit with some institutional changes. If,   5 
instead, the «endogenous» model becomes relevant in dimension 
and dominant in impact on global growth, the current monetary 
order is not useful and therefore cannot be accepted anymore. 
Leaving the currency regime as it is, the subjection to an heavily 
floating dollar can be reduced by paying a price in terms of real 
growth.  By  using  flexible  exchange  rates  for  the  euro,  the 
Eurozone achieved such a goal. But, given the perverse effects on 
EU exports due to their high elasticity to price, the result of the 
floating  regime  of  the  euro  with  respect  to  the  dollar  is  that 
monetary and financial disequilibria have been transferred to the 
real sector. 
This is the main  reason why China has adopted a peg on the 
dollar instead: history of post-WWII development teaches us that 
fixed exchange rates can be a relevant instrument of development 
and  of  exports  and  domestic  growth  rate.  The  catch  here,  of 
course, is that the real sector is isolated from external monetary 
shocks; but these shocks risk of being transferred, sooner or later, 
to  the  domestic  monetary  sector  through  the  monetary  base 
created by the pegging of the yuan to avoid its revaluation. 
As we see, negative effects are not limited to the countries which 
adopt  fixed  exchange  rates,  but  are  relevant  for  any  country, 
given the current levels in the of dollar supply coming from the 
US or from the foreign central banks reserves. 
There  is  a  widespread  consensus  on  the  interpretation  of  the 
«American locomotive» model. As an example, we can cite the 
relationship between export and growth in Italy
5. Starting from 
1960s,  Italy  has  experienced  strong  growth  rates  depending 
mostly  on  products  by  some  industrial  sectors,  generally 
denominated “made in Italy” sectors. The elasticity of growth to 
these exports is still very relevant, on average 0.30% according to 
some our recent estimates
6. Before joining the EMU, therefore, 
one  of  the  possible  policies  to  stimulate  growth  was  the 
competitive devaluation of the lira: after the EMU, these policies 
were  not  possible  anymore,  and  the  loss  of  exchange  rate 
                                                 
5 See Graziani (1992). 
6 Viviani (2005).   6 
sovereignty has become a problem for Italy when the US started 
the current depreciation phase of the dollar. 
We must say that Keynes was right in seeing a close relationship 
between fixed exchange rates (but multilaterally adjustable) and 
economic development, at least in the «western» area. However, 
he added, for this scheme to work, some limitations in short-term 
capital  movements  are  necessary,  at  least  as  substitutes  of  an 
adequate control in domestic monetary creation. This means that 
domestic monetary disequilibria had to be contained within the 
national boundaries and, should structural differences in inflation 
rates  arise,  they  should  have  been  treated  by  international 
cooperation within the International Monetary Fund. 
The other precondition that Keynes proposed, and which was not 
accepted either in the Bretton Woods Agreement or in the Rio 
Agreement in 1968, was the creation of an international monetary 
standard  for  every  country  including  the  US,  that  he  called 
bancor, to state that it should have been managed to be good as 
gold. Those proposing the term «special drawing rights» surely 
were less imaginative than Keynes! 
Under  the  pressure  of  the  American  interests,  effectively 
supported  by  liberist  economists,  the  Bretton  Woods 
international monetary regime was abandoned with an unilateral 
decision  by  the  US,  switching  to  a  flexible  exchange  rates 
regime, encouraging and supporting a growing liberalization in 
short-term international capital flows, and igniting a system in 
which  all  the  countries  except  one  had  to  try  to  accumulate 
current  account  surpluses  in  order  to  obtain  dollars.  In  the 
growing currency confusion that followed, a number of financial 
innovations were born, generally known as «derivatives». 
With  the  introduction  of  derivatives,  the  fundamental  rule  of 
monetary creation, i.e. that the market was not able to determine 
the  optimal  quantity  of  money  and  that  this  task  had  to  be 
allocated to an independent authority, was twisted in favor of the 
market  (Savona,  Maccario  and  Oldani,  2000)  with  different 
reactions country by country.    7 
In  South  America  there  was  a  series  of  failed  trials  of  dirty 
floating,  and  a  case  of  dollarization,  in  Argentina,  ended  in  a 
default and heavy losses to bond holders throughout the world.  
We  must  add  that  dollarization  experiments  leave  open  the 
question of the political legitimacy of surrending the monetary 
sovereignty  to  another  Government,  which  in  turn  is  neither 
interested nor disposed to discuss its monetary policy. 
In  Europe,  a  system  with  the  maximum  possible  rigidity  of 
exchange rates, the one corresponding to a monetary union with a 
common currency, was established, with 12 of the 25 countries 
of  the  EU  joining  it  and  the  10  new  entrants  irrevocably 
committed to do the same within a relatively short period of time. 
The external value of the Euro was left floating. 
In Japan a form of dirty floating was adopted, sometimes coming 
very close to a fixed exchange rates regime. In China, and in 
other East Asian countries with export-oriented economies, fixed 
exchange  rates  were  adopted,  although  successfully  only  for 
China  (if  we  are  authorized  to  judge  that!),  while  for  other 
countries  like  Indonesia  and  Thailand  the  mismanagement  of 
short-term credit and derivative contracts generated perverse and 
disastrous effects. 
The expectation on the stabilizing virtues of floating exchange 
rates regime was not fulfilled: the US foreign deficits have grown 
to a disturbing share of American GDP, and it seems that larger 
and larger devaluations are required to adjust the imbalances. As 
we  said,  public  deficits  in  the  US  have  been  the  preferred 
instrument  to  support  domestic  demand,  while  being  short  of 
domestic savings. This confirms the close relationship between 
the  characters  of  the  international  monetary  regime  and  the 
American policy of leaving American citizens live above their 
means, i.e. above the domestic real supply. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  process  of  globalization,  pushed  by 
several  tendencies  which  one  of  the  authors  of  this  paper 
(Savona,  1988)  synthesized  in  the  «LISCA  effect» 
(Liberalization,  Internationalization,  Securitization, 
Computerization and Apoliticization), has the merit of exploiting   8 
in economic terms the end of the political blocks following the 
fall of the iron curtain. 
Globalization also has the merit of starting a new development 
model, which substitutes foreign demand with domestic demand. 
This happens through the impulse of foreign direct investments 
(FDI),  which  provide  less  developed  countries  with  an  initial 
endowment of advanced technology, and a growing autonomous 
purchasing power. 
The start of the exponential growth in FDI coincides with the fall 
of USSR and the consequential end of the division of the world 
in  two  political  blocs.  Between  1990  and  2003,  the  stock  of 
incoming FDI per capita has grown from $395 to $1310 in the 
world; in East Asian developing countries from $127 to $394, in 
Eastern Europe and in the CIS from $4 to $385
7. 
The main effect of FDI on these developing countries was, as 
predicted  by  economic  theory,  the  technology  transfer,  and 
subsequentially higher rates of growth, of course also ignited by 
liberalizations and an opening to market economy. As a result, 
some developing economies started by producing goods which 
required low skills and low salaries, attracting therefore vertical 
FDI;  but  the  technology  transfers  contributed  to  render  them 
competitive in the production of higher-skilled and higher value-
added goods, while salaries growed, but remained lower than in 
western  developed  countries.  This  started  an  endogenous 
mechanism of  growth, which doesn’t necessarily need FDI for 
development,  or  attracts  more  horizontal  FDI,  that  is  FDI 
oriented to satisfy the internal demand. China, as an example, is 
switching more and more from traditional to innovative sectors, 
directly competing with  more developed  countries, and on the 
other hand sees a very strong growth in internal demand. 
This  kind  of  model,  of  course,  does  not  need  the  American 
locomotive anymore, because it does not depend on American (or 
European) demand to grow. At the same time, the dominance of 
the dollar is no longer justified. 
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3.  The future of the dollar and the need for a political 
perspective. 
We can now turn to the original question: the value of the dollar 
in  the  next  future.  Will  it  stay  at  the  current  levels  or  will  it 
depreciate furtherly? Given the current status of the international 
monetary regime, we argue that the exchange rate of the dollar 
will remain weak. In the best-scenario case, it will remain around 
the current levels, waiting for the US monetary and fiscal policy 
restrictions already adopted to have their effects on the current 
account of the balance of payments. 
However,  if  the  ECB  will  adopt  a  more  restrictive  monetary 
policy stance, given the recent relaxing in European fiscal policy 
rules (the so called “Stability or Amsterdam Pact”), the effect 
could be a neutralization of American decisions, strenghtening 
the external value of the euro and keeping the dollar weak or 
even weaker. 
Following  a  simple,  traditional  «absorption  approach»,  if  the 
«soft  landing»  of  domestic  demand  pursued  by  the  Chinese 
authorities should evolve in a search for external demand, the 
raise in export could increase the probability of further currency 
disturbances, which could lead to a change in the yuan exchange 
rate regime or, more simply, to a negotiated change in the pegged 
value of the yuan towards the dollar. 
In any case, we expect the American foreign deficit to remain 
close to the current (high) levels, because it depends mainly on 
the  American  domestic  demand  that  no  government,  be  it 
Republican or  Democratic, can afford to curb beyond a given 
limit  by  using  fiscal  policy  instruments.  This  is  confirmed  by 
Bernanke (2005), who in an official speech downplays the role of 
the  federal  deficit  in  the  current  account,  although  he  still 
believes that «reducing the federal budget is a good idea.» 
Judging  by  Bernanke  words,  the  view  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board  –  or  at  least  the  view  of  one  of  its  most  authoritative 
members  –  is  that  the  American  current  account  deficit   10 
essentially  depends  on  causes  external  to  the  US,  namely  – 
among the others – the global (excluding the US) savings glut, 
and therefore that no strong internal action should be taken to 
curb  the  foreign  deficit.  In  his  view,  the  US  economy  still 
presents interesting investment opportunities, thereby attracting 
large  capital  flows  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  This  implies, 
however,  attracting  capital  from  the  «younger»,  developing 
economies, and «for the developing world to be lending large 
sums  on  net  to  the  mature  industrial  economies  is  quite 
undesirable as a long-run proposition (ibid.)» 
On the other hand, «the large current account deficit of the US 
[…]  requires  substantial  flows  of  foreign  financing.  […]  the 
situation will eventually begin to improve, altough a return to 
approximate balance may take some time. Fundamentally, I see 
no reason why the whole process should not proceed smoothly.» 
(ibid.) 
Although omitted by Bernanke, the exchange rate of the dollar is 
often viewed as a suitable instrument  for reducing the current 
account deficit, as predicted by economic theory.  
The problem, however, is that the level of the current account 
deficit  is  such  that  it  cannot  be  adjusted  by  means  of  an 
«ordinary» exchange rate devaluation. Among other things, we 
must consider the low value of the American imports elasticity to 
the  exchange  rate,  even  if  politicians  can  try  to  let  American 
voters believe that the exchange rate can be effective in reducing 
the deficit. Estimates, such as the one produced by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff  (2004),  that  a  20-40%  depreciation  in  the  real  trade-
weighted value of the dollar is necessary to adjust the American 
current  account,  seem  to  confirm  the  failure  of  the  dollar 
devaluation  mechanism  to  adjust  the  current  account,  and  are 
therefore a proof of the inadequacy of this regime. 
American  citizens  are  indifferent  to  the  external  value  of  the 
dollar because it is their own currency. However, they cannot be 
indifferent to their external debt, which grows at $1.8 billions a 
day,  and  to  the  interest  paid  on  it,  that  reduces  their  actual   11 
purchasing power
8. At the same time, they cannot be indifferent 
to the growth of their public debt
9, which is largely – more than 
40% according to estimates
10 – in the hands of the central banks 
of China and Japan.  
These  banks  and  the  other  Asian  central  banks  are  growingly 
nervous with the value of their reserves, and could indeed decide 
to modify their composition, which could lead to a dollar sell-off 
and a further, catastrophic depreciation (at least for the European 
interests) of the dollar. As Roubini and Sestser (2004) say, «no 
doubt the dollar’s position as the world’s reserve currency and 
the depth of U.S.  financial markets creates an intrinsic source of 
demand  for  both  dollars  and  dollar    denominated  assets.  
However, this could prove to be mixed blessing.  The dollar’s  
privileged  position  could  increase  the  risk  that  the  world  will 
finance  large  U.S.  trade    deficits  for  too  long,  leading  to 
excessive  U.S.  debt  accumulation.    This  will  let  U.S.    delay 
needed adjustment, but increase the cost of the adjustment when 
it finally happens.» 
In  the  long  term,  therefore,  independently  from  national 
economic policies, the dollar will remain structurally weak. And 
even  if  this  weakness  is  manageable,  the  risk  of  a  crisis  will 
remain  high.  This  crisis  would  involve  politics,  perhaps  more 
than economics: it would be then advisable to treat it, or much 
better  to  anticipate  it,  by  activating  some  foreign  policy 
instruments.  An  international  agreement  involving  the  G8  and 
China could establish an international monetary standard and fix 
new rules to manage and to avoid international currency crises. 
This has two meanings: the first is that the countries participating 
in the globalization process under the WTO rules must recover 
their monetary sovereignty, wrongly left in the hands of financial 
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markets,  which  today  fix  both  the  quantity  of  money  and  the 
interest rates. 
The  second  meaning  involves  the  costs  and  benefits  of 
cooperation, in economic policy as much as in foreign policy. 
We  believe  that  any  State  has  its  own  set  of  preferences  and 
interests and that its behavior is guided by these preferences and 
interests. It would be therefore misleading to think that any State 
should cooperate on exchange rates – or on any foreign policy 
issue – purely on the basis of a superior and abstract common 
interest. But it would be equally misleading to ignore the benefits 
that  can  arise  from  a  cooperative  behavior,  as  game  theory 
teaches  us.  As  the  history  of  European  integration  shows, 
cooperation can be successful if it is based on a common interest, 
and not successful when it proves to be too strong a limit (as in 
the case of the Stability and Growth Pact) for the preferences and 
interests of the governments. 
It becomes therefore relevant to understand how to convince the 
governments  of  the  US,  of  European  countries,  of  China  and 
Japan that cooperation in exchange rate management is beneficial 
for  all.  International  political  economy  theories  could  give  us 
some interesting insight.  
The realist perspective, in particular, shows us that cooperative 
behaviors  arise  between  states  only  when  non-cooperation 
determines  some  kind  of  vulnerability.  The  existence  of 
asimmetric vulnerabilities implies the existence of issue areas, 
not  necessarily  interconnected,  on  which  the  governments 
confront their preferences and positions. The ability (or of course 
the inability) of one government to link issue areas between them 
is  crucial  to  obtain  a  cooperative  behavior  from  another.  But, 
before  that,  it  is  necessary  that  a  government  understands  the 
existence of an exchange rate issue. What we mean here is that, 
in absence of a common position of the European governments, 
at the Council level, on exchange rate, there is no policy position 
on this issue but the one of the American Treasury. The first step 
of  action  required  is  therefore  that  E(M)U  governments   13 
understand  the  relevance  of  the  issue,  find  an  agreement,  and 
start talking to the US on the basis of a concerted effort. 
Until  now  the  behavior  and  the  exchange  rate  strategy  of  US 
governments  has  been  purely  guided  by  a  narrowly  defined  
national  interest.  But  we  believe  that  an  heavy  international 
currency  crises  would  damage  also  American  interests. 
Therefore, it should be in the American interest to cooperate in 
order to anticipate and avoid it. 
4.  The effects of the current international monetary 
order on global competition. 
Monetary and currency disturbances can hamper fair competition 
in  any  market.  A  stable  monetary  standard  is  a  necessary 
requirement for any  market  to work, and therefore any policy 
curbing  inflation  is  a  policy  that  helps  to  establish  a  fair 
competition. 
While  there  may  be  different  interpretations  on  the  causes  of 
inflation and on the instruments to anticipate and reduce it, there 
is  a  complete  agreement  on  the  fact  that  money  supply  and 
inflation must be managed by an independent public authority. 
This agreement has solid economic foundations, but also political 
ones. The «no taxation without representation» principle involves 
inflation  as  much  as  traditional  fiscal  instruments,  because 
inflation is a hidden tax and therefore an income redistribution 
instrument.  If  not  managed,  inflation  violates  the  above  said 
principle of democracy. 
However,  the  same  agreement  reached  on  the  necessity  of 
fighting inflation has not been reached in the case of an inflation 
deriving from exchange rates devaluations. On the one hand, it 
can also be said that inflation is a cause of devaluations. On the 
other  hand,  the  idea,  expressed  by  Piero  Sraffa  (1920),  that 
internal monetary stability cannot be achieved without external 
monetary  stability,  has  never  been  logically  deepened  and 
empirically tested.   14 
This dispute has been solved in the European Monetary Union to 
promote a common market with fair competition: it  adopted one 
money.  To  promote  a  common  global  market  with  fair 
competition we should have one global money. If we think that 
this global money can be the dollar with floating exchange rates, 
we implicitedly admit that we do not want a global market with a 
fair  competition,  but  only  a  process  of  economic  integration 
called  globalization  without  a  proper  monetary  standard  and 
without an independent institution which manages its offer. 
It must be remembered that in the European Monetary Union the 
problem of the external value of the euro has not been solved. 
The treaties say that the Council has the political responsibility 
and  the  power  to  sign  international  agreements  regarding  the 
euro.  Apart  from  this  institutional  framework,  however,  the 
managing of the exchange rate lays in the hands of the ECB, 
because the Council has never shown any interest in doing that. 
Apart from ordinary management, this is equivalent not to have 
any  exchange  rate  policy  at  all,  or  better  said  to  adopt  the 
currency  policy  of  the  US,  because  the  ECB  only  targets  the 
inflation rate, subjecting any other target to this one. While this is 
correct from the institutional point of view, it is less acceptable 
from  the  political  point  of  view,  because  the  exchange  rate 
responsibility cannot be delegated to another government. 
If, instead of admitting that we have no policy, we say that the 
only thing that matters are purchasing power parities, and that 
therefore the euro exchange rate should be determined purely by 
the markets, our behavior risks to be hypocritical and to put at 
risk the fundamentals of European and American relations, also 
rendering  empty  the  frequent  invocations  of  the  «rules  of  the 
market»  done by governments  to encourage the acceptance of 
reforms regarding pensions, the welfare state or competition. 
The alternative solution to the European one has been to stabilize 
more  or  less  rigidly  the  external  value  of  the  currency, 
accumulating both dollar-denominated reserves and domestic and 
external tensions of the kind we already described.   15 
There are other dangerous effects of market-managed exchange 
rate  variations,  especially  regarding  the  different  behavior  of 
traded and non-traded sectors. As we said before, an appreciation 
of  the  exchange  rate  can  harm  traded  sectors  while  leaving 
indifferent non-traded sectors.  
Be it for any reason, ranging from historical tradition to political 
influence, any economy has traded and non-traded sectors. We 
can roughly say that primary and tertiary sectors are on average 
price-makers,  working  shielded  from  external  competition  and 
with limits to internal competition too, while the industrial sector 
generally is a price-taker. The weight of traded and non-traded 
sectors is difficult to precisely estimate for each country: but we 
can say that it usually ranges respectively between 30 and 40% 
for the former and 60-70% for the latter.  
Given  their  nature,  traded  sectors  are  greatly  influenced  by 
exchange rates: in the case of inflation caused by a depreciation, 
they cannot transfer to the consumer the increase in prices. On 
the other hand, in case of an appreciation, they cannot recover the 
lost margins, because they do not make the price. If exchange 
rates variations depend upon differences in inflation rates, and 
these  differences  depend  in  turn  upon  the  different  relative 
weights of traded and non-traded sectors, the logical consequence 
is that price-maker sectors (or non-traded) determine inflation, 
while traded sectors endure it. If the exchange rate depreciates, 
the non-traded sectors transfer on prices the imported inflation, 
while perpetuating the circle between inflation and depreciation. 
On the other hand, traded sectors can adjust prices only if their 
foreign competitors do it. 
The case of Italy before the euro is a clear textbook example 
(Savona, 1993) of the damages suffered by traded sectors and 
advantages of non-traded ones due to exchange rates variations. 
The logical conclusion is that – independently from their causes 
– exchange rates variations harm traded sectors and benefit non-
traded  ones.  The  consequences  are  market  failures  and  a  bad 
performance  of  the  economy.  Finally,  the  social  organization 
itself is harmed due to the strenghtening of rent sectors and the   16 
weakening of profit ones, i.e. the protectionism will prevail on 
the innovations. 
5.  Conclusions: the dollar is the American currency, but 
a problem for all countries. 
A dollar reflecting the American policy choices, which can be 
synthesized in an extraordinarily high foreign deficit (around 6% 
of  US  GDP),  and  a  relevant  (5  to  4%)  public  budget  deficit, 
harms the economies of the rest of the world, especially those 
which growth is of export-led type.  
In the Eurozone exports are certainly relevant. Our problems are 
both quantitative, because growth and employment are harmed 
by the euro appreciation, and qualitative, because rent sectors are 
being benefited and profit sectors harmed. This result produces a 
worse  social  order.  Directly,  because  less  growth  means  less 
taxes  and  therefore  less  welfare;  and  indirectly,  because 
benefiting non-traded sectors means discouraging the emergence 
of  the  benefits  of  competition.  Our  society  becomes  less 
meritocratic and more parassitary. 
If  China  adopted  flexible  exchange  rates  and  accepted  the 
outcome of the market, or accepted a negotiated revaluation of 
the  yuan,  its  growth  rate  would  be  reduced,  adding  new 
unemployment to the set of unresolved problems of this country. 
This could deteriorate political relations with the US, in an area 
where  international  relations  are  already  exposed  to  the 
unresolved Taiwanese problem. Even in the case of a successful 
«soft  landing»  of  the  Chinese  economy,  the  tendency  to 
appreciate the yuan will be strengthened by the substitution of 
domestic demand with exports and the system will strenghten its 
vicious circle. 
The consequence is that the market is giving its own answer to 
the foreign currency disequilibria created by the US and by the 
currency policies in the rest of the world, but it is not able to 
manage the conflict between the American-led (exogenous) and 
the autopoietic-led (endogenous) growth models. The market is   17 
neither able to manage the potential foreign policy effects of this 
conflict,  particularly  evident  in  East  Asia,  as  it  cannot  pursue 
political or social goals, but only goals related to the rational use 
of the scarcity of resources. In our opinion, the laissez-faire has 
definitely  come  to  an  end,  eighty  years  after  Keynes  (1926) 
declared it. The «market capitalism» needs today more politics, 
or  better  said    more  geopolitics,  than  it  needed  before  the 
globalization process started. 
We cannot exclude either logically or practically that the dollar-
denominated official reserves owned by the Chinese authorities 
will be sold on the market to gain a foreign policy advantage, or 
to regain internal political control in case it is lost by the Chinese 
Communist Party. We should not forget that, at the height of the 
oil crisis in the seventies of the last century, Saudi Arabia defined 
their  dollar  reserves  as  monetary  weapons  (war  instruments), 
which could have put the US and other governments in serious 
difficulties. 
We must also consider the effects on the dollar reserves of oil 
exporting  countries,  which  announced  they  are  considering  a 
diversification of their reserves, pushing an appreciation of the 
euro vis-à-vis the dollar and strengthening the vicious circle in 
the international monetary system. 
In  the  US,  as  stated  by  Bernanke  (2005),  capital  inflows  are 
attracted  mostly  by  non-traded  sectors,  thereby  making  traded 
(and exporters) sectors less profitable. In the long run, this makes 
more difficult to pay the external debt. 
While all countries look at economic variables on a global basis, 
they  pay  less  attention  to  the  relationship  between  economic 
policy and foreign policy. The US appear moderately interested 
in this perspective, while European governments are concentrated 
on  talks  regarding  internal  stability  and  infraeuropean 
cooperation.  It  is  highly  probable,  instead,  that  the  Chinese 
government  is  interested,  given  the  traditional  long-term 
approach of their culture. They could however be forced to react 
quickly to real and currency disequilibria coming from outside or 
to political problems coming from inside.   18 
The world does not show at the moment the “vision”  needed by 
the situation. However, all governments have an interest in the 
exchange rate issue, provided that they see it. The time has come 
therefore  to  switch  from  pure  economic  policy  to  geopolitical 
economy, also considering the geopolitical effects of the deep 
modifications  in  the  global  development  model,  including  the 
demand for democracy and social welfare.  
Popular wisdom says we cannot eat the cake and have it too, 
meaning we cannot passively let the two models of development 
co-exist without a cooperative effort to  minimize the potential 
dangers. If we let this happen, it could be the model driven by the 
stronger to prevail, which is not necessarily the better. In this 
case, we could continue to face, as it happened many times in the 
past, an international monetary regime deeply inadequate to the 
needs of world development and peace.   19 
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